India–US Relations, 1947–2025: From Non-Alignment to a Strategic—but Uneasy—Partnership
Overview
From the moment India became independent in 1947, India-US Relations have been shaped by global geopolitics, national priorities and changing leadership in both capitals. Over nearly eight decades the arc of relations has swung from cautious Cold War distance to a broad strategic partnership in the 21st century — yet the relationship has repeatedly tested the limits of alignment. That tension is visible most sharply in the economic and diplomatic ruptures of the late 2010s and the political optics created by U.S. outreach to Pakistan. This article traces the major phases of India–U.S. ties from 1947 through 2025, explains the structural drivers behind cooperation and friction, and offers a concise assessment of where the relationship stands today.
1947–1960s: India-US Relations – Independence, non-alignment and initial ambivalence
India’s founding leadership — above all Jawaharlal Nehru — embraced a policy of non-alignment. The aim was to preserve India’s sovereignty and developmental space amid the Cold War rivalry of Washington and Moscow. That posture produced both opportunities and friction with the United States. On the one hand, New Delhi sought Western technical and economic assistance; on the other, India’s refusal to join U.S. security coalitions and its criticism of colonialism created an enduring political distance. Several flashpoints — including the U.S. tilt towards Pakistan in certain crises and differing positions on China and Korea — reinforced a perception in India that Washington and New Delhi did not share a straightforward strategic partnership in the first two decades after independence.
1970s–1980s: India-US Relations during Indo-Soviet convergence and Cold War realities
The Cold War’s dynamics pushed India and the Soviet Union into a closer political and military relationship. A landmark moment came in August 1971 when India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation — a formalisation of strategic cooperation that had major consequences during the 1971 war and beyond. That period entrenched India’s reputation for strategic autonomy: New Delhi drew on Soviet military supplies and diplomatic backing even as it continued to keep channels open to the West. The Indo-Soviet relationship shaped New Delhi’s defence procurement, foreign-policy calculations, and economic links for decades.
1990s: India-US Relations after end of the Cold War, economic reform and cautious rapprochement
The collapse of the Soviet Union remade India’s strategic environment and economic options. With the Soviet aid system gone and India liberalising its economy in 1991, New Delhi gradually diversified its international ties. The 1990s contained both strain (notably U.S. sanctions after India’s 1998 nuclear tests) and the first cautious signs of a deeper relationship as mutual interests in trade, energy and technology became more pronounced. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, bilateral contacts — especially at the commercial and people-to-people level — began to expand more rapidly.
2000s–2010s: A warming partnership — defence, trade and diaspora ties
The first two decades of the new millennium saw the relationship evolve into what many analysts called a “strategic partnership.” This era produced diplomatic milestones: the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement (mid-2000s), elevated defence cooperation, and growing trade and investment flows. The Indian diaspora in the United States — a major constituency in both economic and political terms — helped bridge business, academic and cultural ties. Cooperation on counter-terrorism after 2001, joint military exercises and institutionalised dialogues deepened mutual engagement.
2018–2019: Tariffs, GSP removal and a rupture in economic trust
Even as strategic ties strengthened, economic relations hit a major bump in the late 2010s. In 2018 the U.S. imposed broad Section 232 tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), a move that swept across many trading partners and triggered formal consultations and disputes. In 2019 the United States removed India from its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), revoking preferential duty treatment for many Indian exports — an action New Delhi criticised and which had real effects on sectors and firms. These trade steps were widely perceived in India as an abrupt, punitive approach, and they left a memory of economic vulnerability: a strategic partner could also deploy trade measures in ways that damaged Indian exporters and disrupted confidence.
2019: India-US Relations and Trump’s outreach to Pakistan
At roughly the same time as trade tensions with India were visible, the U.S. administration under President Donald Trump held highly publicised meetings with Pakistani leaders — notably Prime Minister Imran Khan’s Oval Office visit in 2019. Those encounters and Trump’s public praise for Pakistani interlocutors were noticed and discussed in New Delhi. The juxtaposition — punitive trade measures toward India on one side and warm diplomatic gestures toward Pakistan on the other — exacerbated Indian anxieties about U.S. reliability and priorities in South Asia. The episode was as much about perceptions as it was about policy: diplomatic optics can deepen or erode strategic trust even when security cooperation continues in other domains. (India Pakistan Relationship)
2020–2023: Repair attempts, technology ties and partial trade resolution
The post-Trump years featured efforts on both sides to rebuild economic trust while consolidating security cooperation. Defence sales, logistics agreements and joint exercises continued to advance. At the same time, Washington and New Delhi opened institutional channels for technology and critical-infrastructure cooperation — areas such as semiconductors, space and AI where both governments see overlapping strategic stakes. Notably, in June 2023 the U.S. and India reached an agreement to terminate several World Trade Organization disputes connected to the Section 232 measures; India agreed to remove some retaliatory tariffs in exchange for resolution and clearer rules, signalling a pragmatic fix to a painful disagreement.
2024–2025: Persistent cooperation, renewed Pakistan engagement and an uneasy equilibrium
By 2024–2025 the relationship had settled into an uneasy equilibrium: strong bilateral defence and technological cooperation co-exist with structural economic irritants and continuing differences over third-party ties. Meanwhile, reported U.S. outreach to Pakistan in 2025 — including trade talks and high-level visits — reignited Indian concerns about Washington’s regional prioritisation. For New Delhi, any perception that U.S.–Pakistan warmth comes at the expense of India’s strategic interests prompts nervous recalibration. At the same time, India continues to deepen ties with the United States in many practical fields — from defence logistics to joint R&D — because both sides judge the partnership useful against the backdrop of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.
Why India balances — the logic of strategic autonomy
Across these decades, one theme recurs: India’s commitment to strategic autonomy. Whether in the Cold War it meant non-alignment, or in more recent years it has meant maintaining ties with Russia while deepening relations with the United States, New Delhi carefully hedges. The reasons are material (defence supplies, energy needs), historical (memory of alignments that hurt Indian interests) and political (domestic audiences that prize independence in foreign policy). This autonomy is often a source of friction with Washington — which prefers clearer alignment — but it is also an engine of India’s foreign-policy resilience.
Key drivers of cooperation and friction today
- Cooperation drivers: converging security concerns in the Indo-Pacific; shared interest in technology supply-chain diversification; the economic and innovation linkages tied to the Indian diaspora.
- Friction drivers: trade protectionism and tariff politics; India’s continuing defence and energy ties with Russia; sensitivities around U.S. outreach to Pakistan and human-rights or governance debates that surface in U.S. domestic politics.
Policy paths that can stabilise the partnership
To make the relationship more durable, three pragmatic steps would help:
- Institutionalise trade dispute resolution: a standing bilateral trade council with a quick-response mechanism could prevent ad hoc tariff moves from becoming strategic ruptures.
- Transparent third-party diplomacy: when Washington engages Pakistan (or any regional actor), explicit communication with New Delhi about objectives and limits would reduce perception-driven mistrust.
- Deepen economically binding cooperation: joint semiconductor projects, co-funded R&D centers, and shared supply-chain investments create mutual loss from rupture and thus strengthen incentives to maintain ties.
Conclusion: A relationship of rising stakes and recurring tests
From Nehru’s non-aligned vision to the Indo-Soviet convergence of the 1970s, from the post-Cold War thaw to the 2018–2019 tariff episode and recent U.S.–Pakistan engagements, the India–U.S. relationship has been dynamic and often paradoxical. The two democracies collaborate where their strategic interests align — in defence, technology and many economic sectors — yet they retain the capacity to hurt one another through sudden policy moves. The central political test for both capitals is simple but hard: can they build durable, institutionalised channels that absorb tactical disagreements without letting them unravel broader strategic cooperation? The answer will shape regional security, global supply chains and the diplomatic architecture of the Indo-Pacific for years to come.